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Beyond Murderous Dialectics:  
On Paradoxical Thinking and Maoism
Fabian HEUBEL*1
Abstract
This essay has been inspired by the writings of the contemporary Neo-Confucian philoso-
pher Mou Zongsan and the German sinologist Wolfgang Bauer. It assumes that the power 
of Mao Zedong’s thought sprung from its ability to systematically subordinate the trans-
formative philosophy of the classical Book of Changes to the Marxist model of revolutionary 
class struggle. If dialectical thinking requires thought to think against itself and thereby 
be able to continuously change itself from the inside, Mao seems to have been a master of 
dialectical thinking. One of the intellectual impulses for the Great Cultural Revolution was 
the radically unsentimental judgement that, in order for the socialist revolution to succeed, it 
was necessary to erase the ancient Chinese legacy of paradoxical thinking, and that this was 
a precondition of the possibility of Mao’s Sino-Marxist discourse. But the enormous power 
that Mao’s thought derived from the tension between revolutionary heroism and trans-
formative flexibility revealed itself as self-destructive. Mao tried to fight against the failure 
of his revolutionary vision and the possibility that the wisdom of paradoxical thinking and 
the classical heritage of China could, finally, gain the upper hand in the ongoing struggle for 
modernization. From this perspective, this essay touches upon a contradiction, which can be 
understood as the principle contradiction of contemporary Chinese philosophy: the contra-
diction between the defence of Sino-Marxism as the ideological foundation of a “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” on the one hand, and the renaissance of traditional culture and 
classical learning on the other, which entails a powerful challenge to this very foundation.
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Onkraj morilske dialektike: O paradoksnem mišljenju in maoizmu
Izvleček
Navdih za esej prihaja iz razmišljanj sodobnega neo-konfucijanskega filozofa Mou Zong-
sana in nemškega sinologa Wolfganga Bauerja. Osnovna predpostavka eseja je, da je moč 
Mao Zedongove misli izvirala iz sposobnosti, da transformativno filozofijo klasične Kn-
jige premen sistematično podredi marksističnemu modelu revolucionarnega razrednega 
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boja. Če dialektično mišljenje v končni fazi zahteva od misli, da misli proti sami sebi in 
s tem neprestano spreminja samo sebe od znotraj, se zdi, da je bil Mao mojster dialek-
tičnega mišljenja. Ena od intelektualnih pobud za Veliko proletarsko kulturno revolucijo 
je bila radikalno nesentimentalna sodba, da je za uspeh socialistične revolucije nujno iz-
brisati staro dediščino paradoksnega mišljenja in da je to predpogoj za možnost Maovega 
sino-marksističnega diskurza. Vendar pa se je neznanska moč, ki jo je Maova misel črpala 
iz napetosti med revolucionarnim heroizmom in transformativno fleksibilnostjo, izkazala za 
samodestruktivno. Mao se je poskušal boriti za svojo revolucionarno vizijo in za možnost, da 
bi lahko modrost paradoksnega mišljenja in dediščina klasične Kitajske nazadnje prevladali 
v nenehnem spopadu za modernizacijo. S tega stališča se ta esej dotakne težave, ki jo lahko 
razumemo kot temeljno protislovje sodobne kitajske filozofije: protislovja med obrambo 
sino-marskizma kot ideološkega temelja »socializma s kitajskimi značilnostmi« in renesanso 
tradicionalne kulture in klasičnega učenja, ki predstavlja velik izziv temu temelju.
Ključne besede: dialektika, paradoksalno mišljanje, Mao Zedong, Mou Zongsan, Wolf-
gang Bauer
Murderous Dialectics
For Mou Zongsan, one of the most important and widely recognized Confu-
cian philosophers of the 20th century, Mao Zedong was a “great devil.” A devil, 
however, whose thoughts and actions were nourished by philosophical sources, 
especially materialistic dialectics. For Mou, this materialistic turn in dialectics has 
been extremely harmful. Polemically, he intertwines dialectical thinking, political 
practice, and historical catastrophe: 
The harm was not yet apparent in Hegel himself, but with Karl Marx, the 
arising of dialectic from absolute existence settled upon material exist-
ence as “materialist dialectics,” whose emergence was not just the “source 
of tremendous chaos,” but became actual chaos for the whole world and 
caused millions of heads to fall. Look at how many people died in China 
because of this! Mao Zedong was a great devil, and the source of his dev-
ilry is in Hegel. (Mou 2003a, 464; Engl. 114–19) 
For Mou Zongsan, the chain from Hegel to Marx to Mao entails a materialistic 
turning of Hegel’s idealistic dialectics. The idea of dialectics, thereby, expands its 
reach into the realm of historical developments, which now can be understood as 
driven by struggles between different social classes. The political implementation 
of this idea has thus led to murderous consequences.
Even a superficial glance at the Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Mao Ze-
dong) will suffice to show that he thought of class struggle in China as a struggle 
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for life and death––and acted accordingly: “A revolution is an insurrection, an act 
of violence by which one class overthrows another.” (Mao 1968, 6–7) In March 
1949, for example, he expresses the conviction that the class struggle would not 
end with the military victory over the bourgeoisie led by Chiang Kai-shek ( Jiang 
Jieshi): “After the enemies with guns have been wiped out, there will still be ene-
mies without guns; they are bound to struggle desperately against us, and we must 
never regard these enemies lightly.” (ibid., 9) Even before the victory in the civil 
war and the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, Mao stressed that the 
class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie would continue after the 
Communist seizure of power, and “continue to be long and tortuous and at times 
will even become very acute.” (ibid., 10) It is well known that ideological struggles 
were fought again and again with relentless cruelty in the years after 1949, and 
until Mao’s death (see Dikötter 2014, 2010, 2016). For critics of the Marxist theo-
ry of class struggle (from Sun Yat-sen (Sun Yixian) to prominent Confucian phi-
losophers), the disastrous consequences of socialism in China are not merely due 
to mistakes in the realization of a good idea, but due to the basic idea of historical 
materialism and a “history of civilization” driven by class struggles as such (Mao 
1968, 10).1 In addition, the ideological struggles became especially brutal because 
of the nationalist orientation of the socialist revolution in China, which merged 
social and national liberation, the class enemies with the traitors of the people.
“Der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland” (“death is a master from Germany”). This 
famous line from a poem by Paul Celan seems to be true also for some masters 
of German philosophy: the dialectical thought of Hegel and Marx is, for Mou 
Zongsan, one of the devilish sources, which in Chinese reality “caused millions of 
heads to fall.” There is a strong consciousness of the catastrophic side in modern 
Chinese history among contemporary Neo-Confucians like Mou Zongsan. They 
have shown great interest in German philosophy, but what about reflections on 
the dark side of contemporary German history? May they even be accused for not 
recognizing and addressing the philosophical significance of the “destruction of 
the European Jews” (Raul Hilberg)? Particularly with regard to the central posi-
tion of Auschwitz in Frankfurt School Critical Theory, silence in this respect must 
be deeply disturbing. One reason may be that racial ideology and the idea of racial 
struggle (Rassenkampf in the vocabulary of National Socialism) that emerged in 
19th century Europe did not play a role in China’s internal political struggles; we 
do not find the philosophical exaltation of this idea that is evidenced in Heide-
gger’s link between anti-Semitism and the “history of being” (see Trawny 2015). 
1 “Classes struggle, some classes triumph, others are eliminated. Such is history, such is the history of 
civilization for thousands of years. To interpret history from this viewpoint is historical materialism; 
standing in opposition to this viewpoint is historical idealism.”
Asian Studies VII (XXIII), 1 (2019), pp. 37–54
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There has been some influence of social-Darwinist racial ideology, expressed in 
the sometimes almost alarmist fear about the extinction of the “yellow race” in its 
struggle with the “white race” (evident in Sun Yat-sen’s The Three Principles of the 
People but also in the Confucian Manifesto of 1958) and in largely defensive ideas 
of national self-strengthening. On the other hand, class ideology and the idea of 
class struggle were so powerful and effective that they had to be perceived as a 
philosophical problem of extreme urgency. Therefore, the criticism of materialistic 
dialectics and the theory of class struggle is, for Mou Zongsan, one of the main 
reasons to develop an idealistic moral philosophy. And the relation between Kant 
and Hegel is, in contemporary Chinese philosophy, marked by ideological strug-
gles that have left deep and painful traces in the interpretations of their writings.
In the Chinese context, why are moral questions connected to the discrimination 
and murder of millions of Jews by the regime of National Socialism often regard-
ed as a European problem, or even as German idiosyncrasy? In most cases, this 
attitude does not seem to imply a revisionist intention. Rather, it simply seems 
difficult to understand why the destruction of the European Jews should be at-
tributed such a prominent place in the history of modern historical catastrophes. 
Adorno, for example, famously stated that a “new categorical imperative” has been 
imposed on humanity by Hitler, namely, “to arrange their thoughts and actions so 
that Auschwitz does not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen” (Ador-
no 1975, 358; Engl. 365). From a Chinese perspective, does it not appear as a 
bitter irony of history that shortly after Adorno published his reflections on that 
“new categorical imperative,” not only students but also well-known philosophers 
in Western Europe indulged in glorification and defence of Mao Zedong, who 
undoubtedly belongs to the ranks of 20th century political mass murderers? Did 
many left-wing intellectuals not hail Mao as an alternative to the encrusted So-
viet ideology and celebrate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with bar-
baric naivety? The collective blindness toward leftist cruelty remains mysterious 
so long as those fundamental problems of liberalism and liberal democracy are 
ignored, problems arising from their entanglement in economic structures that 
are, in many respects, exploitative and disastrous. How deep must contempt and 
hatred for “liberal thinking” and “capitalo-parliamentarism” be in order to make 
philosophers like Alain Badiou willing to defend, with provocative gestures, the 
thought of Mao Zedong, whose murderous consequences are well documented 
today? He concedes “serious mistakes” and the “high price of human lives,” only 
to praise, in the next moment, the great dialectical mastery of Mao. This leader of 
the Chinese Communist Party succeeded in fighting his party “completely alone,” 
and in rebelling against state socialism while being, at the same time, the highest 
representative of that socialist state; he has thus, for Badiou, opened the possibility 
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of revolutionizing the socialist revolution; by pushing a revolutionary party to 
abolish itself, he opened up the possibility of a breakthrough towards a politics 
“without a party” (Badiou 2009, 124–26).2 These are interesting points, but the 
euphemistic undertone appears to be fatally reminiscent of Martin Heidegger’s 
loyalty to the “greatness of the movement.” 
In the last chapter of his Negative Dialectics, entitled “Meditations on Metaphys-
ics,” Adorno revolts against the tendency towards “squeezing any kind of sense, 
no matter how bleached, out of the victims’ fate” (Adorno 1975, 354; Engl. 361). 
He is convinced that the Nazi “administrative murder of millions” (ibid., 355; 
Engl. 362) excludes any construction of historical-philosophical sense. No course 
of history, however dialectical, no cunning of reason, however twisted, may or 
can be allowed to appropriate these crimes as a step toward historical progress or 
the realization of higher ends. The understanding of Auschwitz as a “rupture of 
civilization” and as the “signature of an entire age” ( Jürgen Habermas) attempts 
to mark this radical discontinuity. In his unsentimental self-reflections and para-
doxical turnings of negative-dialectical thinking, Adorno considers that Hitler’s 
thoughts and actions confront philosophy with the impossibility of coming to 
terms with them. But those thoughts and actions by no means fall out of history, 
and, on the contrary, must be reconsidered, precisely for this reason, in their pre- and 
post-history. One condition of the possibility for realizing the “new categorical im-
perative” is thus to integrate Auschwitz into modernity, to recognize it as a paradox-
ical consequence of modernity. Adorno’s reflections show that Germany’s cultural 
and political development after the Second World War remains dialectically tied to 
the Nazi-regime from which it tried to distance itself as clearly as possible.
Does it make any sense to see a paradoxical cunning of reason at work in the Nazi 
regime because its barbaric destructiveness opened up the possibility of Germa-
ny’s successful democratization? Or: Cannot Maoism in its most destructive, an-
ti-cultural, and anti-Confucian excesses be understood as the inevitable price to 
be paid, either for the victory of communism or for the so called “rejuvenation of 
the Chinese nation?” A price that may have been very high, but ultimately seems 
to be justified from a greater historical perspective? And has the barbaric destruc-
tiveness of the Communist regime not only failed to achieve the goal of destroy-
ing traditional culture and classical learning, but even created the conditions for 
their creative transformation? 
These are questions that arise when one tries to critically approach the constella-
tion of Hegel, Marx, and Mao as Mou Zongsan understood it, or the “continuity 
2 See also the “Introduction” by Slavoj Žižek to Mao (2007).
Asian Studies VII (XXIII), 1 (2019), pp. 37–54
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of the dialectical line Hegel-Marx-Lenin-Mao” (Holz 1970, 84). What emerges 
then are questions about the relationship between the dynamic of modernization, 
dialectical thinking, and the transformational philosophy of the Book of Changes, a 
relationship with which the German thinkers Joachim Schickel and Hans Heinz 
Holz had already dealt in an interesting manner at the time of the Great Cultural 
Revolution (Schickel 1976, 231–33; Holz 1970, 72–99). First of all, they have 
made clear how grotesquely one-sided the esoteric reception of this classical book 
has been in the West. They have also perceived something the desperate anti-com-
munism of Mou Zongsan had to underestimate in its traumatic fear concerning 
the destruction of Chinese culture by the politics of the Chinese Communist Par-
ty, namely, that Mao’s thought, however unconsciously and against his will, was 
able to go beyond Hegel, Marx, Lenin, and the Soviet Russian ideology precisely 
because he was able, in a strangely radical way, to make the transcultural dynamics 
of Old and New, East and West fruitful for his own thinking. The “spiritual atom 
bomb of infinite power,” as Lin Biao, in his Introduction to the Quotations of 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung describes Mao’s thought (Mao 1968, xxxiv), is, as I would 
like to suggest, the result of a transcultural dynamic in which dialectical either-or 
(entweder-oder) and paradoxical as-well-as (sowohl-als-auch) have entered a com-
plex and explosive relationship.
Mou Zongsan’s criticism of Mao’s theory of contradiction seems intellectually 
helpless in the face of the power and violence of such revolutionary thought. 
One reason for the discursive weakness of Mou’s thought consists in the failure 
to conceive the Book of Changes as a “logical model of permanent revolution” 
(Holz 1970, 79).3 Mou can be regarded as an expert on the subject as one of his 
first book publications from 1935 was Natural Philosophy and the Moral Mean-
ing of the Book of Changes. Later, his criticism lead to the moral accusation that 
the philosophy of the Book of Changes has been materialistically abused by Mao, 
by exploiting the ability to “observe subtle tendencies of development in the 
change of things”––like those legalist philosophers who helped the first emper-
or of the Qin dynasty to unify the empire. In this sense, Mou considered the 
Chinese Communist Party as guided by a modernized version of Legalism.4 
3 “Daß die Interpretation der Zeichen 63 und 64 zum logischen Modell einer permanenten 
Revolution kommen muß, liegt auf der Hand.”
4 From very early on, Mou Zongsan developed a sharp understanding of dialectics as technique of 
power (quanshu 權術) in the hands of Mao Zedong. Simon Leys has defined this sardonic side 
of dialectics with admirable precision: “Dialectics is the jolly art that enables the Supreme Leader 
never to make mistakes––for even if he did the wrong thing, he did it at the right time, which 
makes it right for him to have been wrong, whereas the enemy, even if he did the right thing, did 
it at the wrong time, which makes it wrong for him to have been right” (Leys 2013, 194; see also 
Mou 2003b, 89–119). 
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Mao sometimes provocatively compared himself to the violent unifier of the 
empire, and Mou likes to allude to this comparison. But this perspective is 
rather misleading insofar as the explosive potential of the hybrid entanglement 
between transformation and revolution in Mao’s theory and practice remains 
largely unthought. As a consequence, Mou Zongsan seeks refuge in the moral 
demonization of Mao Zedong. 
“Heaven” has used the private and partisan aspirations of the first emperor to 
promote the public good. This is a famous idea from the historical-philosophi-
cal writings of Wang Fuzhi that Mou Zongsan links to the paradoxical effects 
of the cunning of reason in Hegel. However, Mou hardly makes any attempt 
to involve Mao and materialist dialectics in the movement of such paradoxical 
thinking. Theoretically, he withdraws from it by introducing a sharp contrast be-
tween idealistic and materialistic dialectics, in which the limits and potentials of 
his philosophy become particularly obvious. It seems as if, in the rupture between 
these two types of dialectics, Mou despairs of the transcultural entanglement be-
tween Old and New, East and West. He retreats to a simplistic opposition between 
old and new China, Chinese and Western dialectics: the idealistic or, as he also 
says, “ascetic dialectics” (gongfu bianzheng 工夫辯證), which has been developed in 
Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism is contrasted to the dialectics of the Chi-
nese Communists, who absorbed from the West the poison of a materialistic turn 
of dialectics, already contained, for him, in the inadequacy of Hegelian thought. 
According to Mou, this inadequacy consists in the fundamental problem of having 
brought dialectics into the world of historical struggles and thereby anthologising 
them instead of restricting them, as in classical Chinese philosophy, to the ascetic 
sphere of “spiritual cultivation” (jingshen xiuyang 精神修養). For Mou, this self-lim-
itation of dialectics has a great advantage. First, the old conflict between logical and 
dialectical contradiction can be circumvented by introducing a distinction between 
logical paradoxes that can be solved and dialectical paradoxes that are unsolvable. 
What emerges here is the possibility of a dialectics that becomes aware of the para-
doxical and, at the same time, turns into an exercitium, into an exercise of cultivation 
dedicated to learning how to think and live with and through paradoxes. “Dialectics 
must finally be applied again to dialectics,” as Mou Zongsan says. As soon as this 
happens, the broad field of “ascetic dialectics” opens up, a field Confucian, Daoist, 
and Buddhist philosophers have been concerned with for millennia. Mou seems 
to be convinced that only “ascetic dialectics” have saved and can save dialectical 
thought from “turning into disaster” (zhuanwei huohai 轉為禍害). (see Mou 2003a, 
462–65; Mou 2003c)
At this point, a philosophical correspondence to Adorno’s move from Hegel’s di-
alectics to negative dialectics comes to the fore. In negative dialectics, as Jürgen 
Asian Studies VII (XXIII), 1 (2019), pp. 37–54
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Habermas observed in his criticism of Adorno, dialectical thinking has once again 
“reflected on itself,” thereby transforming dialectics into something that can “only 
be understood as an exercitium, as an exercise” (Habermas 1987, 515). If Mou 
Zongsan had known Adorno’s turn of dialectics against itself, he might have ar-
rived at a different conclusion: an understanding of dialectics as excercitium, as 
an exercise in self-cultivation began, finally, to emerge in modern Western phi-
losophy. However, the likelihood that both would have been able to discuss this 
problem in a meaningful way is very slim. More or less unavoidable misunder-
standings about the ideological opposition between idealistic and materialistic 
dialectics would probably have made a dialogue impossible from the start. 
Both philosophers had developed their philosophical positions through pain-
ful meditations on the historical catastrophes associated with the names of 
Mao Zedong and Adolf Hitler, respectively, but Mou’s reflections on Mao led 
him to a radical critique of materialism, while Adorno’s reflections on Hitler 
led him to a radical critique of idealism. 
Mou claims that Wang Fuzhi already developed a dialectical thinking, which 
resembles that of Hegel’s philosophy of history, and applied it to China. 
But, for him, this is a highly ambivalent achievement, because thereby Wang 
also paved the way for the reception of Marxist dialectics within Chinese 
thought. With regard to Wang Fuzhi’s philosophy of energetic transforma-
tion, which is systematically intertwined with his historical-philosophical 
reflections, Mou’s tendency to oppose idealistic-ascetic dialectics (China) 
with materialistic dialectics (Europe) turns out to be problematic. The af-
finity between Wang Fuzhi’s philosophy and the thought of the young Mao 
seems to have led Mou Zongsan to a forced and uncompromising rejec-
tion of philosophical perspectives developed within the so-called “energetic 
learning” (qixue 氣學) of Neo-Confucianism from Zhang Zai to Wang Fu-
zhi.5 Even today, followers of Mou Zangsan tend to deny the very existence 
of “energetic learning” within the broader field of Song and Ming dynasty 
Neo-Confucianism. 
This line of Confucian learning, strongly influenced by the “Grand Commen-
tary” of the Book of Changes and the Zhuangzi, has elaborated a discourse on 
what can be called “experience-dependent metaphysics” (erfahrungsabhängige 
Metaphysik). Mou is reluctant to use the paradoxical dialectics developed in 
the Book of Changes, and articulated in all its richness by Wang Fuzhi’s com-
mentary, for an immanent critique of materialistic dialectics. In order to do 
this, it would have been necessary to break through the ideological frontline 
5 For a more detailed discussion of this topic see Heubel (2007).
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between idealistic and materialistic dialectics and connect the “paradoxical as-
well-as” (guijue xiangji 詭譎相即), which he identified as the basic motive of 
Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist philosophy, with the “ontology” of material-
istic dialectics. 
This is at least what I try to do in this essay: On the one hand, to liberate philoso-
phy and reflections on the modernization of China from the teleological narrow-
ness of dialectical materialism and to open it to the horizon of the three dominant 
traditions of modern political discourse (conservatism, liberalism, socialism) and 
their paradoxical constellation; on the other hand, however, the question I want 
to address here is to what extent the awareness of the paradoxical needed for such 
an analysis already has, in itself, “ascetic” conditions and cannot be separated from 
exercises in paradoxical thinking. By cultivating an “equalizing assessment” of ide-
alistic and materialistic dialectics and by transforming their relationship into a 
paradoxical one, the freedom to a “solution by non-solution” (Lösung durch Nicht-
Lösung) begins to emerge.
Solution by Non-solution
A rustic from Lu sent to King Yuan of Song a puzzle consisting of two 
knotted cords. King Yuan issued an order throughout the state that an-
yone who was clever should come and unravel them, but no one could 
do so. A disciple of the dialectician Ni Shuo begged leave to go unravel 
them, and he succeeded in untying one but not the other. He explained, 
“It is not that it could be untied and that I was incapable of doing it, rath-
er that it was inherent in the nature of the thing that it was impossible 
to untie it.” He asked the rustic of Lu about it, and he said, “That is so. 
It is inherent in the nature of this knot that it is impossible to untie it. 
I knew it could not be untied, because I made it. But you knew without 
having made it––thus, you are cleverer than I am.” Therefore, those like 
the disciple of Ni Shuo untie things by not untying them. (The Annals of 
Lü Buwei 2000, 412)
It seems to me an ingenious intuition of Wolfgang Bauer to conclude the last 
chapter of China and the Search for Happiness, focusing on Chinese Marxism and 
Asian Studies VII (XXIII), 1 (2019), pp. 37–54
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Maoism, with this parable (Bauer 1989, 575; Engl. 419).6 For Bauer, this parable 
expresses the “paradoxical secret” of every search for happiness, of every pursuit 
to realize ideals and utopias; the stronger people aspire to their realization, the 
more distant those ideals become. In his reflections on this paradoxical secret, he 
touches upon issues which are imposed by a Chinese modernization that has, for 
a long time, neglected or even denied its inherent paradoxical knot, because it has 
mistaken forgetfulness of the paradoxical for a necessary precondition of modernity. 
Furthermore, Bauer proposes a theoretical perspective that makes an interesting 
suggestion for further reflections on the modern dialectic of enlightenment and 
liberation. He proposes to “solve” (lösen) or “untie,” in a “wise and more cultivated” 
manner, the “mysterious problem” as to why the ardent striving for the realization 
of modern ideals and utopias has, paradoxically, turned into unprecedented disas-
ters. The solution he proposes is “solution by non-solution” (Lösung durch Nicht-
Lösung). This solution is at the same time non-solution, insofar as it consists of 
relinquishing the solution of that part which is unsolvable; it entails to solve (or 
undo, untie, unravel) the knot through contemplation of its (partial) insolubility. 
To the “solution by non-solution” (yi bu jie jie zhi 以不解解之) Bauer contrasts 
the classic example of a “total solution”––the violent cutting of the Gordian knot 
with the sword. “During long periods of its history, and particularly in recent cen-
turies, the West preferred,” according to Bauer, this kind of solution (Bauer 1989, 
575; Engl. 420). 
In the same chapter, Bauer interprets the modern idea of revolution in China in 
the light of the philosophy of transformation developed in the Book of Changes. 
He thereby seeks to better understand the inscrutability of the relationship be-
tween revolution and transformation. He provides some interesting evidence for 
6 Wolfgang Bauer uses the translation by Richard Wilhelm (Frühling und Herbst des Lü Bu We 1928, 
267–68). My discussion has been strongly inspired by this translation, which plays with the word 
lösen (jie 解) in a manner I find more consistent than that of the English translation, where jie is 
rendered as “unravel” and “untie”: “Ein Mann aus Lu schenkte dem König Yüan von Sung einen 
Knoten. Der König ließ einen Befehl durch sein ganzes Land gehen, daß alle geschickten Leute 
kommen sollten und den Knoten auflösen. Aber niemand vermochte ihn aufzulösen. Ein Schüler 
von Erl Schuo bat um die Erlaubnis hinzugehen und ihn auflösen zu dürfen. Aber er konnte nur 
eine Hälfte auflösen, die andere Hälfte konnte er nicht lösen. Da sprach er: ‘Es ist nicht so, daß 
man ihn auflösen kann und nur ich ihn nicht aufzulösen vermag, sondern er läßt sich überhaupt 
nicht auflösen.’ Man befragte den Mann von Lu. Der sprach: ‘Ja man kann ihn wirklich nicht 
auflösen. Ich habe ihn gemacht und weiß, daß er nicht auflösbar ist. Aber einer, der ihn nicht 
gemacht hat und doch weiß, daß man ihn nicht lösen kann, der muß noch geschickter sein als ich.’ 
So hat der Schüler des Erl Schuo den Knoten dadurch gelöst, daß er ihn nicht gelöst hat.” (魯鄙
人遺宋元王閉，元王號令於國，有巧者皆來解閉。人莫之能解。兒說之弟子請往解之，乃
能解其一，不能解其一，且曰：「非可解而我不能解也，固不可解也。」問之魯鄙人。鄙
人曰：「然，固不可解也。我為之而知其不可解也。今不為而知其不可解也，是巧於我。
」故如兒說之弟子者，以不解解之也。)
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the hypothesis that the modernization of China has been shaped by the blending 
of revolution and transformation, but also for the idea that the classical Chinese 
philosophy of transformation can only be meaningful for the present if it is not 
simply opposed to revolutionary change. In the course of these reflections, the 
question arises whether the transcultural entanglement between the Old and the 
New, between East and West in contemporary China can be “solved.” Moreover, 
can the paradoxical constellation of these moments perhaps even be understood 
as internal to Mao Zedong’s way of thinking and acting? Bauer remarks that Mao 
was, from the beginning, “the most Chinese” in the group of leading Chinese 
communists (Bauer 1989, 533; Engl. 389). However, Bauer’s analysis does not fail 
to suggest that Mao was also highly “un-Chinese,” because, like no other, he advo-
cated a “total solution,” a solution that did not actually solve the “secret problem” 
(the paradox of Chinese modernization), but “destroyed it in an almost barbaric 
fashion” (Bauer 1989, 575; Engl. 419).
Is the hermeneutic contrast of total solution (West) and solution by non-solu-
tion (China), introduced by Bauer, misleading because it does not sufficiently rec-
ognize that there have been experiments with total solution in Chinese history 
too, and that Mao was able to affirmatively refer to those experiments? Such an 
objection is certainly not unjustified. It should, however, not obscure Bauer’s fas-
cinating hypothesis that, on many occasions, the Chinese Communist Party fate-
fully ignored the “necessarily complicated, paradox-stricken conditions” in China, 
whereas, on the other hand, it also helped to bring about a breakthrough for a 
dialectical thinking that is, to a considerable extent, less forgetful of and more 
tolerant towards paradoxes.
Bauer’s analysis points to the affinity between the philosophy of transformation in 
the Book of Changes and the Maoist understanding of permanent revolution as a way 
of life. He arrives at the remarkable diagnosis that the pathological consequences 
of Chinese modernization can be traced back to a kind of short-circuit between 
transformation and modern revolution. The dialectic of stillness and movement is 
replaced by the heroization of revolutionary unrest: “According to Mao’s conception 
of the permanent revolution, such movement does not lead to a happy society, but 
already represents happy society” (Bauer 1989, 559; Engl. 408). The transfiguration 
of restlessness reaches into the realm of the ethical, where immobility and injustice 
correspond to one another. Within Maoist anti-traditionalism, Confucianism rep-
resents a rigid, hierarchically ordered, unequal society, and therefore is understood as 
an obstacle to modernization, which must be removed for moral reasons, as well. In 
this sense, a de-Confucianised, de-cultured, running wild type of human being was 
gradually created, “inclined toward combat and movement by natural disposition, 
and who also carried this orientation into the civilian sphere.” It was exactly this 
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human type Mao sought to strengthen as an ideal during the Great Cultural Rev-
olution in order to “combat the ‘demon’ of solidification [Erstarrung]” (Bauer 1989, 
561; Engl. 410). This cult of movement, ready for every sacrifice, arose out of the 
fear that the forces necessary to cope with the task of Chinese modernization could 
be so greatly diminished and hindered by the burden of tradition that they might 
cause the failure of the whole project of modernity in China: 
Every step toward stabilization is now viewed with suspicion as the onset 
of a new stagnation, as the beginning of the end. All recourse to the past 
arouses the fear that, like so much mildew, the dust of the centuries will 
settle once again on what has newly grown. This is the reason for the con-
stant forward thrust, those countless movements and leaps. They are meant 
to stay the drift into the sleep of the past. (Bauer 1989, 572; Engl. 417–18) 
Can the dialectic between stillness and movement, which has been a central com-
ponent of the classical philosophy of transformation, be reintroduced into this 
revolutionary movement, which is increasingly, in the aftermath of the Great Cul-
tural Revolution, not experienced as happiness, but as disastrous restlessness? Can 
the socialist tradition be transformed in this direction? Bauer discusses this ques-
tion philosophically by linking Mao’s theory of contradiction and practice with 
the “conceptual framework of the Book of Changes” (Bauer 1989, 538; Engl. 393). 
Following a quotation from Mao’s “On Contradiction,” Bauer remarks: 
To find the bases for this conviction of a “dialectics of nature,” we need 
not go back to Engels, still less to Trotsky, with whose “Permanent Revo-
lution” Mao only has the name in common. Here also the traces lead back 
to the oldest Chinese book, the Book of Changes. For it is hardly possible 
to find a more exact description of the ontological system in back of the 
Book of Changes than this statement of Mao about the creative contradic-
tions of things. (Bauer 1989, 541–42; Engl. 395)
The Chinese notion of transformation stems from historical sources that date 
back to the archaic beginnings of philosophical discourse in the Book of Chang-
es. From this perspective, it seems reasonable to conclude that Mao’s vision of 
modernization, including his anti-traditional radicalism, arose from intertwining 
transformation and revolution. Dialectical thinking in 20th century China may 
have been more long-lived than Soviet ideology––by which it has been influenced, 
but with which it also fought bitterly––because the combination of materialistic 
dialectics and philosophy of transformation helped to develop greater ideolog-
ical flexibility. This, at least, seems to be a plausible explanation for the strong 
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tendency of socialism with Chinese characteristics towards historical experimen-
talism. By way of this experimentalism, the Chinese Communist Party succeeded, 
even after 1989, in maintaining the necessary amount of political legitimacy that 
cannot be secured by brute force and sophisticated mechanisms of control alone. 
Now, the assumption emerges that precisely within this socialist experimentalism 
a historically deep-reaching capability of paradoxical thinking and doing was able 
to overwinter. This enduring capability has recently found expression in the idea 
of a new communication among the three traditions of conservatism, liberalism, 
and socialism or in the dialogue among Chinese tradition, Western influence, 
and Marxism. If these developments can be understood as an indication for the 
reactivation of paradoxical thinking in contemporary China, the question arises 
whether they serve, primarily, the purpose of stabilizing so-called “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.” This may be true to a certain extent, but this renaissance 
of paradoxical thinking within contemporary Chinese thought corresponds also 
to the discursive crisis of legitimacy which haunts the Communist regime. The 
internal dynamic of this renaissance may become so challenging and far-reaching 
that, sooner or later, it may lead to the collapse of the cultural and ideological 
(political) framework established in 1949. 
Following Wolfgang Bauer, I would like to suggest that the explosive power of 
Mao’s thought emerged from the ability to systematically subordinate transform-
ative thinking to the Marxist model of revolutionary class struggle. Mao sensed 
the dangers that this ancient legacy could pose to his revolutionary project. If dia-
lectical thinking requires thinking to think against itself, to be able to turn against 
the innermost driving forces of one’s own thinking in order to constantly change 
it from the inside, Mao can be seen as a master of dialectical thinking. One of 
the intellectual impulses for the Great Cultural Revolution has been the radically 
unsentimental judgement that, in order for the socialist revolution to succeed, it 
is necessary to erase the ancient legacy of paradoxical thinking which has been a 
condition of possibility for Mao’s Sino-Marxist discourse.
This is consistent from the perspective of a dialectics infused in messianic utopi-
anism, which seeks, in one last turn, to sublate itself (sich selbst aufheben). In this 
regard, to speak of a “continuity of the dialectical line Hegel-Marx-Lenin-Mao” 
seems to be justified. From the perspective of the transformative and paradoxi-
cal––or negative––dialectics of the Book of Changes, however, this consequence is 
highly non-dialectical. Thus, the enormous powers of change and destruction that 
Mao’s thought derived from the dialectic of revolutionary heroism and transform-
ative flexibility must, inevitably, turn into self-destruction: “Things cannot remain 
permanently destroyed,” as is said in an explanation to the hexagram 24, “The Re-
turn (The Turning Point)” (I Ging 1924, drittes Buch, 102). The return of the light 
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(bright) and living force announces itself only inconspicuously by the emergence 
of a continuous Yang-stroke on the bottom line of the hexagram fu (☳). However, 
this revitalization, “just at the moment when it seems completely conquered,” is 
inevitable––at least according to philosophers who think about the renaissance 
of classical Chinese culture from the rather detached perspective of an ongoing 
“to-and-fro between cultivation and vitalization” (wenzhi xiangfu 文質相復) (Ke 
2012, 37–91). Mao fought, with all his powers, against the failure of his revo-
lutionary vision and thus against the possibility that the wisdom of paradoxical 
thinking and the classical heritage of China could still gain the upper hand in the 
ongoing struggle for modernization. How to deal with the contradiction between 
the defence of revolutionary heritage and the renaissance of classical culture? This 
question is one of the most important, if not the most important, philosophical 
challenges in contemporary China.
Philosophically speaking, Mao’s struggle against the legacy of the Book of Chang-
es contains a fundamental problem within his own thinking––the dialectics of 
nature. “Consistent dialecticians from European philosophical traditions reject a 
dialectics of nature,” as Hans Heinz Holz argues (Holz 1971, 82). However, for 
Holz, such a rejection is based on the assumption that “the cosmological bond 
between man and nature is broken” (ibid.).7 As mentioned above, Wolfgang Bauer 
recognized in Mao’s theory of contradiction and his conception of the “creative 
contradictions within things,” as well as in his conviction of a dialectics of nature, 
the “ontological system” of the Book of Changes (Bauer 1989, 540–42; Engl. 394–
95). Similarly, Holz sees in this system an operational model for a “‘nature-grown 
dialectic’ (naturwüchsige Dialektik), which at the same time develops a typology 
of situations with regard to content and a formalized procedure of movement 
out of contradictions” (Holz 1971, 83). In my view, however, Holz misjudges the 
difficulties that Mao had with the recognition of this side of his own thought. 
Mao himself had a very ambiguous relationship with cultural tradition; the legacy 
of classical learning, especially Confucianism, was generally regarded, by Chinese 
Communists, as an obstacle to the modernization of China. On the one hand, 
Mao styled himself in a traditional way as poet and calligrapher, but on the other 
hand did everything in his power to destroy the social and political conditions of 
classical literati culture. Seen in this light, his thinking seems to have been deeply 
influenced by a paradoxical knot formed by Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy on the 
one hand and the classical thought of transformation on the other. Against the 
legacy of paradoxical dialectics within his own thought, Mao believed that the 
7 For Holz, Leibniz has developed the “only European system of thought in which related problems 
have been overcome in an exemplary way” (Holz 1971, 117). 
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sword of revolution in his hand could still bring this knot to a “total solution” 
(Bauer: totale Lösung).
The pathological and traumatic consequences of Mao’s attempts at total solution 
are hardly understood and worked through in China, even decades after his death. 
On the contrary, the urgently needed working through the Maoist past is still not 
encouraged and faces many obstructions. Hence, the barriers that obstruct the 
communication of the three traditions and the equal realization of their norma-
tive ideals are undoubtedly enormous (see Heubel 2018). Part of the theoretical 
attempt to come to terms with this troubled past could be the reconstruction of 
discursive struggles among conservative, liberal, and socialist positions that have 
accompanied the twisted and tortuous way of Chinese modernization. In this 
essay, it is not possible to enter into a deeper discussion of the cultural, social, 
economic, and political conflicts which make it almost impossible to solve the 
knot of modernization by (partial) non-solution. I would just like to mention one 
particularly interesting barrier to communication, which seems to render such a 
possibility unthinkable. 
It is characteristic of the dialectic of enlightenment that enlightenment produces, 
both itself and out of itself, the monsters that destroy it. This is one of those modern 
paradoxes which, of course, can be seen at work not only in Europe, but also, in one 
way or another, in all the regions of the world that have been dragged into the mael-
strom of modernization in the course of European expansionism. Today, European 
intellectuals find it extremely difficult to recognize the consequences and side ef-
fects of European influence in the sometimes very unpleasant challenges emerging 
out of globalization. Europe has exported the paradoxes of modernity as well as its 
pathologies, and has contributed to the emergence of hybrid discourse formations 
all over the world, largely being unaware of it. Worse than that: the philosophical 
discourse of modernity in Europe seems to lack the basic curiosity and sincerity 
to face the paradoxical consequences of this discourse in non-Western parts of the 
globe. Without self-reflection the tendency towards further self-provincialization 
of contemporary European philosophy will intensify. For now it is the “others,” the 
“foreigners,” who rather than “we (Europeans)” bear the conditions of possibility 
for a trans-positional thinking capable of working with the complex connections 
between Old and New as well as East, West, South, and North.
Conclusion
It is hard to deny that Mou Zongsan hits the mark when he claims that Mao’s 
thought abused the wisdom of the Book of Changes for his revolutionary purpose. 
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He made the transformational logic of the 64 hexagrams serve a theory of contra-
diction, which is no longer concerned with the twisted communication marked by 
the paradoxical turning and reversal of interconnected positions, but mainly with 
the annihilation of the political enemy. However, Mao was enough of a dialectical 
thinker to know that, on ideological grounds, no total solution is possible. He 
nevertheless still strived for it. 
“The sudden change after his death in 1976 revealed his great vision as Chi-
mera” (Bauer 1989, 576). Mao foresaw, feared, and condemned the paradoxical 
turn to economic liberalism that occurred soon after his death. Does this not 
indicate that, finally, the paradoxical dialectics of transformation prevailed over 
the murderous dialectics of revolutionary struggle? Mao was, until the very end, 
a revolutionary ideologue, deeply convinced that the tolerance towards paradox-
ical thinking cultivated in classical Chinese philosophy would be an obstacle 
to China’s modernization, and that it should be replaced by a friend-enemy 
distinction that would serve revolutionary class struggle. Since Mao’s death, 
the deep-seated fear that transformative and paradoxical thinking may lack the 
competitive power to meet global challenges seems to have gradually given way 
to greater confidence in a Chinese “way” of modernization. Thorough reflections 
on this development, however, are in need of further elaboration, even within 
the world of contemporary Sino-philosophy (dangdai hanyu zhexue 當代漢語哲
學). This may be due to the fact that Western philosophers still have great dif-
ficulties in overcoming their old fear of the paradoxical, and still tend to regard 
paradoxes primarily as a problem or even as an illness, a pathology which has 
to be cured.
It is not only Chinese hybrid modernization that fits well with the phrase from 
Kant’s famous essay “Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?”: “Here 
as elsewhere, when things are considered in broad perspective, a strange, unex-
pected pattern in human affairs reveals itself, one in which almost everything is 
paradoxical.” Does the confrontation with contemporary Chinese philosophy not 
lead to the assumption that this statement is true in a far more radical sense than 
Kant could have foreseen in his time: because the way of Chinese modernization 
urges “us” to learn how to think and live paradoxically?
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